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INTRODUCTION
In the 2014 case In re Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc.,1 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the first federal
circuit court to hold that bankruptcy trustees cannot use the “strongarm” powers of 11 U.S.C.A. 544(b)2 to avoid a fraudulent transfer
where the transferee is the federal government.3 More specifically, the
Seventh Circuit held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity makes it
impossible for the trustee to satisfy the requirements of Section 544(b)
in actions against a federal government entity.4 This holding is
counterintuitive, because another provision of the Bankruptcy Code,
Section 106(a)(1), abrogates federal sovereign immunity as to Section
544.5 The interplay of these two Code6 sections is nuanced, and the
 J.D. candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2014).
2
11 U.S.C.A. § 544(b) (West 2014).
3
Equip. Acquisition Res., 742 F.3d at 746.
4
Id.
5
11 U.S.C.A. § 106.
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Seventh Circuit’s opinion creates some tension between the two
provisions.
Equipment Acquisition Resources is important, not just because it
is controversial, but also because it goes to the heart of how courts
construe statutes. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Equipment
Acquisition Resources and the opinions of prior courts on the same
issue demonstrate what courts value when construing statutes, and
how those values promote or obstruct bankruptcy policy. Additionally,
the Seventh Circuit’s discussion of sovereign immunity is instructive
as to how courts view the relationship between individuals and the
government. Even so, the Seventh Circuit’s approach and its ultimate
holding are vulnerable to criticism on several grounds.
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit stated that it was simply
interpreting Sections 544(b) and 106(a) according to their plain
meaning.7 However, this approach fails to acknowledge that there are
other legitimate interpretations of the provisions’ supposedly plain
meaning, as every court to have confronted this issue prior to
Equipment Acquisition Resources has disagreed with the Seventh
Circuit. Also, the Seventh Circuit’s holding renders Section 106(a)—
the section waiving sovereign immunity—partially meaningless. If, as
the Seventh Circuit held, 544(b) cannot avoid transfers to federal
government entities with sovereign immunity, then why did Congress
decide to abrogate sovereign immunity with regard to all of Section
544? Further, the policy grounds on which the Seventh Circuit’s
decision rests are hollow and speculative, and contrary to traditional
bankruptcy objectives. The court’s decision should therefore be
overruled, and not followed in other circuits.
Part I of this article begins by briefly discussing the source of the
bankruptcy trustee’s strong-arm powers in the Bankruptcy Code. Part
II examines the factual and procedural background of Equipment
Acquisition Resources. Part III then analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion in Equipment Acquisition Resources alongside the other
6

Unless otherwise stated, all references to the “Code” or to a “Section” refer to
the Bankruptcy Code contained in Title 11 of the United States Code.
7
Equip. Acquisition Res., 742 F.3d at 747.
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district court cases that have addressed the same issue. Part IV
assesses the strength of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, and argues
that other courts should not follow the Seventh Circuit’s holding.
I. BACKGROUND
Understanding the holding of Equipment Acquisition Resources
requires some background knowledge, including a familiarity with the
legal doctrines and Bankruptcy Code provisions that form the
framework of the case. This first Part briefly explains the law on the
central issue in Equipment Acquisition Resources, and then discusses
the holdings of other courts that have addressed the same question.
A. Bankruptcy Code Provisions
1. Section 544(b): The Strong-Arm Powers
Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, commonly referred to as
the source of the “strong-arm” powers,8 is one of the most important
tools in the bankruptcy trustee’s tool-belt. Broadly speaking, this
section gives the trustee the power to avoid a fraudulent transfer by the
debtor, if the transfer would be voidable by one of the debtor’s
creditors under state law.9 In other words, Section 544(b) empowers
the trustee by allowing him or her to exercise the rights that creditors
of the debtor have under state fraudulent transfer law.10 After
avoidance, the trustee can then claw back, or recover, the transferred
assets for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and the debtor’s
creditors.11
8

See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. (In re Image Worldwide,
Ltd.), 139 F.3d 574, 576-77 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Munford, Inc., 98 F.3d 604, 609
(11th Cir. 1996) (“Section 544(b) is commonly referred to as the ‘strong arm’
clause.”).
9
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06(2) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2014).
10
Id.
11
11 U.S.C.A. § 550(a).

3
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Turning first to the language of Section 544(b)(1), the provision
states, in relevant part, that “the trustee may avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the
debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an
unsecured claim . . . .”12 The “applicable law” referred to in 544(b)(1)
is non-bankruptcy, state law.13 And most often, the state statute the
trustee invokes is some form of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(“UFTA”), which has been adopted by the legislatures of 43 states.14
In sum, 544(b)(1) effectively “allows the trustee to use the applicable
state’s law of fraudulent conveyances to set aside obligations incurred
by the bankrupt.”15
There are some important limitations on the trustee’s ability to
invoke state fraudulent transfer law through Section 544(b). First, the
trustee’s rights are no greater than those of a creditor acting under state
law.16 It is often said that the trustee steps into the shoes of the
creditor. Courts have explained this limitation as follows:
It is well established that the effect of this section is to
clothe the trustee with no new or additional right in the
premises over that possessed by a creditor, but simply
puts him in the shoes of the latter, and subject to the
same limitations and disabilities that would have beset
the creditor in the prosecution of the action on his own
behalf; and the rights of the parties are to be
determined, not by any provision of the Bankruptcy
Act, but by the applicable principles of the common
law, or the laws of the state in which the right of action
12

Id. § 544(b).
See, e.g., Kittay v. Korf (In re Palermo), 739 F.3d 99, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2014);
Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005); In re
Valley Mortgage, Inc., No. 10–19101–SBB, 2013 WL 5314369, at *1 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 2013) (“Generally, ‘applicable law’ is interpreted to include state law causes
of action”).
14
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06(2).
15
In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1988).
16
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06(3).
13
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may arise. In other words, the Bankruptcy Act merely
permits the trustee to assert the rights which the
creditor could assert but for the pendency of the
bankruptcy proceedings, and if, for any reason arising
under the laws of the state, the action could not be
maintained by the creditor, the same disability will bar
the trustee.17
Because the trustee can only act to the extent that a creditor of the
debtor could act under state law, bankruptcy courts look to state law in
defining the properties and limits of the trustee’s strong-arm powers.18
Accordingly, in Section 544(b) avoidance actions, the court focuses on
the creditor’s powers under state law, and not the Bankruptcy Code
alone.19
Another important limitation on the trustee’s strong-arm powers is
the requirement that some creditor actually exist who could bring a
claim under the state’s fraudulent transfer law.20 This “actual creditor”
requirement is derived from the language of 544(b). The trustee or
debtor in possession must plead the existence of a creditor who could

17

Davis v. Willey (In re Willey) 263 F. 588, 589 (N.D. Cal. 1920). The Davis
court was actually describing the statute that preceded Section 544, because the
present Bankruptcy Code did not exist in 1920. Nonetheless, the predecessor to
Section 544 was functionally equivalent to the current version.
18
See, e.g., In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 B.R. 855, 862-63 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 2012) (“The trustee's rights under § 544(b) are limited to the ‘rights of an
existing unsecured creditor because § 544(b) rights are completely derivative of
those of an actual unsecured creditor.’ Further, the trustee will be able to attack the
transfer only to the extent a creditor with an allowable claim can avoid the transfer
under applicable state law.”) (internal citations omitted); In re Fleming Packaging
Corp., No. 03–82408, 2007 WL 1021884, at *9 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007) (“When
bringing an avoidance action under Section 544(b) . . . the extent of the trustee's
rights is determined entirely by state law.”).
19
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
20
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06(1) (“If there are no creditors against
whom the transfer is voidable under the applicable law, the trustee is powerless to
act under section 544(b)(1).”).

5
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have avoided the transfer at issue.21 That creditor must have been in
existence when the purported fraudulent transfer took place and on the
date of the bankruptcy filing.22 The creditor’s claim against the debtor
also must be one which would be allowed in bankruptcy.23 Courts and
commentators sometimes refer to this creditor as the “golden creditor,”
because it is a lynchpin of Section 544(b) analysis.24 However, courts
generally do not require the trustee to specifically name or rely on one
particular creditor.25 As discussed below, the actual creditor
requirement was central to the court’s decision in Equipment
Acquisition Resources.26
2. Reach-back Period
In addition to Section 544, there is another primary means for
avoiding fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy Code: Section
548.27 Whereas Section 544 is the source of the trustee’s state law
avoidance powers, Section 548 is the source of the trustee’s
bankruptcy law fraudulent transfer avoidance powers. Section 548
mirrors state fraudulent transfer law, bringing the Bankruptcy Code
into agreement with state law.28
However, sections 544 and 548 differ in at least one important
way. Section 548 has a shorter, two-year reach-back period; in other
words, the trustee may only avoid transfers “made or incurred on or
21

Leibowitz v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. (In re Image Worldwide, Ltd.), 139
F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Leonard, 125 F.3d 543, 544 (7th Cir. 1997).
22
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06(1).
23
Id. The law as to allowance of claims is outside the scope of this article, but
it is sufficient to note that allowance is an additional requirement to establish
standing under Section 544(b).
24
See, e.g., Faulkner v. Kornman (In re The Heritage Org., L.L.C.), 413 B.R.
438, 459 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009); Turner v. Phoenix Fin., LLC (In re Imageset,
Inc.), 299 B.R. 709, 715 (Bankr. D. Me. 2003).
25
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06(1).
26
See infra, Part III.A.
27
11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (West 2014).
28
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.01.
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within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition.”29
Conversely, state fraudulent transfer law, namely the UFTA, has a
four-year reach-back period.30 Therefore, the Section 544 strong-arm
powers are an essential tool for avoidance because they give the
trustee access to the longer reach-back period under state law, and the
ability to avoid transfers that the trustee otherwise could not avoid
under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code alone.31
3. Section 106(a): The Bankruptcy Code’s Abrogation of Sovereign
Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a primordial common law doctrine which
bars suit against sovereign entities.32 Immunity from suit is an attribute
that is “inherent in the nature of sovereignty . . . .”33 Thus, the states
and federal government are “not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without [their] consent.”34 The American legal system
29

§ 548(a)(1).
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9 (“A [claim for relief] [cause of
action] with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation under this [Act] is
extinguished unless action is brought: (a) under Section 4(a)(1), within 4 years after
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year
after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the
claimant; (b) under Section 4(a)(2) or 5(a), within 4 years after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred . . . .” (emphasis added)).
31
See, e.g., In re Dolata, 306 B.R. 97, 115 (W.D. Penn. 2007) (comparing
Section 548(a)(1) with Pennsylvania’s fraudulent transfer statute and noting that they
are “expressly distinguishable” in that “transfers that may be subject to attack under
§ 548(a)(1) are limited to those that are made within one year [now two years] of the
date of a debtor's bankruptcy petition filing, whereas a transfer generally remains
assailable under [Pennsylvania’s statute] provided that an avoidance action is
brought thereunder within four years of such transfer . . . .”) (internal citations
omitted).
32
See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1999); Charles
Alan Wright, et al., 14 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3654 (3d ed.) (“It now is well
settled by numerous judicial precedents—although for a century the rule was stated
only in dicta—that the United States may not be sued without its consent.”)
33
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890).
34
Id.
30
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inherited this principle from English common law at the time of the
nation’s founding.35 The United States Supreme Court has observed
that “[w]hen the Constitution was ratified, it was well established in
English law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in its
courts.”36 At present, the prevailing view on the Supreme Court is that
the framers understood and accepted sovereign immunity, and that it is
implicit in the framework of the Constitution.37
Sovereign immunity operates to deprive a court of subject matter
jurisdiction over the suit unless the sovereign consents to be sued.38
Generally, only Congress can consent to, waive, or abrogate the
federal government’s sovereign immunity.39 Where Congress
abrogates sovereign immunity through a legislative act, it must do so
explicitly and unequivocally.40 Waivers are strictly construed, and any
ambiguity as to the waiver is construed in favor of the sovereign.41
In the past, the states and the federal government invoked
sovereign immunity as a bar against actions brought by debtors and
35

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-16 (1999) (“Although the American
people had rejected other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a
sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the
Constitution was drafted and ratified.” (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419,
437-46 (1793) (Iredell, J., Dissenting))).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Charles Alan Wright, et al., 14 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3654 (3d ed.)
(“The natural consequence of the sovereign immunity principle is that the absence of
consent by the United States is a fundamental defect that deprives the district court
of subject matter jurisdiction.”).
39
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 106.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds.,16th ed. 2014) (“[F]ederal and state governmental bodies enjoy sovereign
immunity from suit except when their immunity has been abrogated by Congress,
waived by some action taken by the governmental body or eliminated by a specific
provision of the Constitution itself.”); U.S. v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34
(1992).
40
Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 33-34.
41
Id. at 34 (“the Government's consent to be sued ‘must be construed strictly in
favor of the sovereign, and not enlarge[d] . . . beyond what the language requires’”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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trustees.42 However, the Bankruptcy Code now contains an explicit
abrogation of sovereign immunity in Section 106.43 This section went
into effect with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, which amended
Section 106 to its current form. 44 Section 106 now explicitly
enumerates each section of the Bankruptcy Code for which the
abrogation applies.45 Section 106(a)(1) states, in relevant part,
“Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign
immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth
in this section with respect to . . . [s]ection[] . . . 544 of this title.”46
Section 106(a)(2) gives courts the power to “hear and determine any
issue arising with respect to the application of such section[] to
governmental units.”47 The phrase “governmental unit” is a defined
term under the Code, broadly including all federal, state, and local
government entities.48 And Section 106(a)(3) provides that “[t]he court
may issue against a governmental unit an order, process, or judgment
under such sections or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
including an order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not
including an award of punitive damages.”49
According to the House Reports and legislative history for Section
50
106, Congress enacted Section 106 because the statute that preceded

42

2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 106.01.
11 U.S.C.A. 106(a) (West 2014).
44
Pub.L. No. 103–394, § 113, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
45
§ 106(a).
46
Id.
47
Id. § 106(a)(2).
48
Id. § 101(27) (“The term ‘governmental unit’ means United States; State;
Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency,
or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States trustee while serving
as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a
Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic
government.”).
49
Id. § 106(a)(3).
50
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 317 (1977), reprinted in App. Pt.
4(d)(i); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1978).
43

9
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it failed to unambiguously abrogate sovereign immunity.51 In Hoffman
v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance and United States
v. Nordic Village, Inc., the Supreme Court held that Section 106’s
predecessor failed to successfully abrogate sovereign immunity,
because its language was not sufficiently explicit. 52 However,
following the 1994 amendments, there is now no disagreement;
Section 106 unambiguously abrogates sovereign immunity as to the
Code sections listed in 106(a).53
B. Prior Court Decisions Addressing the Issue
While the Seventh Circuit was the first federal circuit court of
appeals to consider the issue of whether a trustee can use Section
544(b) to avoid fraudulent transfers to the federal government,54 it was
not the first court to do so. A number of district courts have also
passed on the issue. In re C.F. Foods, L.P.55 is the first and one of the
most frequently cited of such cases. In C.F. Foods, two partners
formed a Pennsylvania limited partnership for the purpose of engaging
in business as a candy wholesaler.56 The partners solicited
investments, promising returns of eighteen to thirty percent.57 In
reality, the business was a vehicle for fraud. In 1988 the business
reported that it had $140 million in sales even though it actually had

51

WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 14:4 (3d
ed.) (“The Committee Report points out that the amendment was intended to
overrule both Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maintenance and U.S. v.
Nordic Village Inc.”); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 106.
52
See Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 (1989);
U.S. v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
53
See supra note 51.
54
In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2014) (“This
is an issue of first impression for any circuit court of appeals.”).
55
Liebersohn v. IRS (In re C.F. Foods, L.P.), 265 B.R. 71 (Bankr. E.D. Penn.
2001).
56
Id. at 74.
57
Id.
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only $5 million in revenue.58 In order to perpetuate and cover up the
fraud, the partners recorded fake transactions and sales figures.59
Based on the reported sales figures, the partners incurred federal
personal income tax liability, and they used partnership assets to cover
this liability.60 Between 1996 and 1998, the partnership made nine
payments to the IRS for the partners’ benefit, totaling $3,190,259.38.61
In May of 1999, C.F. Foods entered involuntary Chapter 7
bankruptcy.62 The bankruptcy trustee subsequently filed an adversary
proceeding against the IRS, seeking to recover the tax payments as
fraudulent transfers.63 The trustee asserted that the transfers were
fraudulent under Pennsylvania’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,64
which the trustee invoked through Section 544(b).65 In response, the
IRS took the position that it was immune from the avoidance claim
due to sovereign immunity.66 The IRS argued that outside of
bankruptcy, unsecured creditors would be barred by sovereign
immunity from asserting state law avoidance claims against the federal
government; and because the trustee steps into the shoes of a state law
creditor, the trustee should be similarly barred from bringing a claim
under Section 544 and Pennsylvania’s fraudulent transfer act.67 Put
differently, the IRS contended that Congress had not made the
necessary explicit waiver of sovereign immunity as to any state
fraudulent transfer statutes—Section 106(a) only applied to the
Bankruptcy Code and not state law, and as a result, the trustee should
be barred from asserting the avoidance claim.68
58

Id. at 75.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 75 n.4.
62
Id. at 73.
63
Id. at 74.
64
12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5101, et seq. (West 2014).
65
C.F. Foods, 265 B.R. at 77.
66
Id. at 81.
67
Id. at 82-83.
68
Id.
59

11
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Although the court thought there was some “allure” to the IRS’s
argument, it ultimately held in favor of the trustee.69 After examining
the legislative history of Section 106, the court found that Congress
had unequivocally asserted its power to abrogate the federal
government’s sovereign immunity from actions brought under Section
544.70 This abrogation also covered state law causes of action
subsumed by Section 544(b).71 The Court reasoned that “[b]y
including § 544 in the list of Bankruptcy Code sections set forth in §
106(a), Congress knowingly included state law causes of action within
the category of suits to which a sovereign immunity defense could no
longer be asserted.”72 This reading of 106(a) was correct, said the
court, in light of the statute’s “unambiguous language.”73 The court
conceded that its decision resulted in some incongruity by giving the
trustee greater rights in bankruptcy than a creditor would have outside
of bankruptcy.74 But, as the court observed, this result was consistent
with the broad rights possessed by the trustee by virtue of Section
544.75 Further, the court also justified its decision on policy grounds,
noting that any recovery of assets for the bankruptcy estate benefits all
of the debtor’s creditors as a whole.76
In addition to C.F. Foods, several other district courts have
considered this issue prior to Equipment Acquisition Resources, and
each court’s decision falls in line with the C.F. Foods holding. For
example, In re Custom Contractors, LLC also involved a trustee’s

69

Id. at 86.
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 85.
73
Id. at 86.
74
Id. at 85-86.
75
Id.
76
Id. (“even if there was any ambiguity to § 106(a)—and I find that there is
none—other considerations still weigh heavily against the result sought by the IRS.
Any recovery by the bankruptcy trustee will benefit all of the debtor's creditors,
including the IRS.”).
70
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complaint to avoid and recover transfers from the debtor to the IRS.77
The complaint alleged that the debtor, a limited liability company, had
transferred $199,956.25 to the IRS on behalf of one of its principals.78
The company made the transfer to satisfy the principal’s personal
income tax liability at a time when he was struggling to pay his own
bills, even though the company owed the principal no money.79
The bankruptcy trustee in Custom Contractors sought to avoid the
transfers through Section 544(b)(1) and the Florida Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (FUFTA).80 The IRS then moved to dismiss,
raising the same argument that it had in C.F. Foods—that the trustee
could not avoid the transfers because no creditor outside of bankruptcy
could bring a state law claim against the IRS under the FUFTA due to
sovereign immunity.81 The court again rejected the IRS’s argument.82
Citing to C.F. Foods, the court held that the “unambiguous language of
§ 106” abrogated the federal government’s sovereign immunity as to
state fraudulent transfer laws invoked pursuant to the trustee’s strongarm powers.83 The court reasoned that a contrary reading of the statute
“requir[ing] a trustee to demonstrate that the United States has waived
sovereign immunity in every instance the trustee seeks to rely on state
law for the purpose of § 544 would render the general abrogation of
sovereign immunity under § 106 almost meaningless.”84
Another case following the lead of C.F. Foods and Custom
Contractors is In re DBSI, Inc.85 As in the cases discussed above, the
bankruptcy trustee brought a Section 544(b) claim to avoid and
77

Menotte v. U.S. (In re Custom Contractors, LLC), 439 B.R. 544, 545
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010).
78
Id. at 545-46.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 546; FLA. STAT. ANN. 726.105, et seq. (West 2014).
81
Custom Contractors, 439 B.R. at 546-47.
82
Id. at 549.
83
Id. at 548-49.
84
Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
85
Zazzali v. Swenson (In re DBSI, Inc.), No. 10-54649(PJW), 2011 WL
607442 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
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recover transfers that the debtor made to the IRS on behalf of the
company’s insiders, and the IRS moved to dismiss the claim on
sovereign immunity grounds.86 Here again, the IRS emphasized the
actual creditor requirement of Section 544(b), and argued that a
creditor could not bring an avoidance action against the IRS because
Congress had not explicitly waived sovereign immunity as to the
state’s fraudulent transfer statute.87
Again, the court sided with the trustee, citing approvingly to C.F.
Foods and Custom Contractors and finding their reasoning
persuasive.88 The court looked at the interaction between Sections 106
and 544, and found that “[i]nterpreting § 106(a)(1) to include an
abrogation of the applicable nonbankruptcy causes of action available
to a trustee under § 544(b)(1) comports with the purpose and use of
that provision.”89 The court underscored two reasons that formed the
basis of its holding. First, there is a “long history of empowering
bankruptcy trustees to bring certain state law causes of action,” and
Congress would have been aware of this history when it enacted
Section 106 and abrogated sovereign immunity as to Section 544.90 It
follows, therefore, that when Congress enacted Section 106 it intended
to abrogate sovereign immunity as to state law avoidance actions
brought under Section 544.91
Second, the court found that the IRS’s reading of Section 106 was
problematic because it “would render § 106 practically
meaningless.”92 The court explained:
[According to the IRS], Congress’ abrogation of sovereign
immunity as to § 544 is only one part of the equation . . .
[T]here must also be a waiver or abrogation of sovereign
86

Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
88
Id. at *4.
89
Id. at *5.
90
Id. at *4.
91
Id. at *5.
92
Id.
87
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immunity with respect to the particular “applicable law” . . . .
However, neither [this state’s] legislature nor any state would
have authority to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the
United States as a defense to a creditor claim under the state's
version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act or otherwise.
Thus, the IRS’ argument would apparently render
meaningless Congress’ abrogation of sovereign immunity as
to § 544.93
Put differently, accepting the IRS’s argument would mean introducing
a second hurdle of sovereign immunity, requiring another act of
abrogation or waiver in addition to Section 106.94 The court reasoned
that this outcome was undesirable, because it would render Section
106 ineffective as to Section 544(b) without some extra act abrogating
sovereign immunity for state laws.95
The line of cases that began with C.F. Foods continued unbroken
through the end of 2013 with In re Valley Mortgage, Inc.96 In Valley
Mortgage, the debtor was a corporation used to perpetrate a massive
Ponzi scheme.97 Between 2005 and 2007, the debtor’s president and
majority owner wrote eight checks totaling $161,341.40 to the U.S.
treasury to cover his personal income taxes.98 After the Ponzi scheme
came to light, the corporation went into receivership and filed for
bankruptcy.99 Once in bankruptcy, the debtor in possession sought to
avoid the checks to the IRS as fraudulent transfers.100 Because the last
93

Id. (quoting Sharp v. U.S. (In re SK Foods, L.P.), No. 09–29162–D–11,
2010 WL 6431702, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2010) (unreported)).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
VMI Liquidating Trust Dated December 16, 2011 v. U.S. ex rel. IRS (In re
Valley Mortgage, Inc.), No. 10–19101–SBB, 2013 WL 5314369, at *1 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 2013).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at *2 (“Here, the Debtor filed for bankruptcy on April 19, 2010. The last
transfer in question to the Defendant occurred in July of 2007. Thus, all of the
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of the transfers occurred in 2007, more than two years prior to
bankruptcy, Section 544(b) was the only viable means for
avoidance.101 The debtor therefore invoked the Colorado Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act102 and sought to avoid the transfers as actually
and constructively fraudulent.103
The IRS raised a sovereign immunity defense, 104 and once again
the court rejected it.105 The court held that the waiver of sovereign
immunity in Section 106(a) applied to Section 544(b) “regardless of
whether the application of 544(b)(1) is predicated on a state law cause
of action . . . .”106 In construing Sections 106 and 544 together, the
court reasoned that it would be improper to exclude 544(b) from
Congress’ waiver of sovereign immunity as to all of Section 544:
Congress chose to explicitly waive sovereign immunity with
respect to the entirety of section 544. . . . If Congress
intended to retain a sovereign immunity defense to actions
brought under section 544(b)(1), Congress certainly could
have done so. This Court refuses to read into section 106(a)
an exclusion to the waiver of sovereign immunity which
Congress did not specifically provide. To do so would be

alleged fraudulent transfers to the Defendant occurred more than two years prior to
the Debtor's bankruptcy petition and are therefore outside of [Section 548’s] statute
of limitations.”).
101
Id. at *4 (“[I]n order for the Debtor to assert a timely claim to recover
alleged fraudulent transfers, it must rely on [the state fraudulent transfer law’s]
longer statute of limitations because the limitations period in section 548 of the Code
has expired.”).
102
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-8-101, et seq. (West 2014).
103
Valley Mortgage, 2013 WL 5314369, at *4.
104
Id. (“the [IRS] argues that if sovereign immunity prohibits an unsecured
creditor from bringing a non-bankruptcy state law claim against the Defendant, then
sovereign immunity similarly prohibits a trustee who steps into the shoes of an
unsecured creditor from brining the same non-bankruptcy state law claim”).
105
Id.
106
Id.
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improper and result in a judicially created amendment to an
otherwise clear and unambiguous statute.107
The Court also noted that its decision was in line with “numerous
other courts” that had also held that the waiver of sovereign immunity
in Section 106 extended to state law causes of action brought via
Section 544.108
The cases discussed above are representative of an unbroken
chain of court decisions from C.F. Foods in 2001 through Valley
Mortgage in 2013. These cases illustrate the persuasive legal
arguments and reasoning that motivated the court in each case to
follow the lead of the C.F. Foods position. C.F. Foods, Valley
Mortgage, and all the cases decided in between are consistent, and the
courts’ opinions are cogent. In each case, the court relied on classic
techniques of statutory interpretation, starting with language of the
statutes,109 and construing it in a way that harmonized with Congress’
intent and the Bankruptcy Code as a whole. Nonetheless, the Seventh
Circuit found reason to part ways with this line of cases.
II. CASE BACKGROUND
Before discussing the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Equipment
Acquisition Resources in Part III below, this Part provides the factual
and procedural background underlying the court’s decision. This Part
begins by setting forth the facts that led up to the suit, followed by a
107

Id.
Id. Interestingly, one of the decisions the court cited to was the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois’s opinion in United States v. Equipment
Acquisition Resources, Inc. (In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc.), 485 B.R. 586 (N.D.
Ill. 2013), rev’d, In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2014),
which was reported prior to the appeal of that case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. At the time of Valley Mortgage, the Northern District’s decision
had not yet been reversed, and it fell in line with C.F. Foods and its progeny.
109
See generally U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)
(“The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] begins where all
such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.”).
108
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brief discussion of the case’s disposition in the bankruptcy court and
district court prior to appeal to the Seventh Circuit.
A. Factual & Procedural Background
The debtor who initiated the bankruptcy proceedings was a
corporation named Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc. (EAR).110
EAR was organized as an S-corporation111 under the laws of Illinois,
and engaged in the business of semiconductor manufacturing
equipment sales and servicing.112 In the years leading up to
bankruptcy, EAR, through its officers and agents, engaged in what
would later be described in pleadings as a “massive fraud.”113 EAR
allegedly sold equipment at inflated prices, then leased the equipment
back, misrepresented the value of the equipment, and pledged the
same pieces of equipment to multiple creditors in order to obtain
loans.114
After the fraud was exposed, EAR’s shareholders elected one
person to act as the sole director of EAR’s board and simultaneously
serve as the company’s chief restructuring officer.115 The restructuring
officer filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on October 23, 2009.116 Postfiling, the restructuring officer conducted an investigation and
110

In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743, 744-45 (7th Cir. 2014).
Because EAR was organized as an S-corp., corporate income passed
through to the owners who then reported that income on their individual tax returns.
Id. (“Subchapter S corporations do not pay taxes on corporate income; instead, the
tax liability is passed through to the corporation's shareholders.”); see generally
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 496 (8th ed. 2000) (“Under flow-through taxation, a firm is
not subject to taxation. Instead, all of the firm’s income and expenses, and gains and
losses, are taxable directly to the firm’s owners. Distributions are not taxed.”).
112
Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc. v. U.S. (In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc.),
451 B.R. 454, 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011), rev’d, In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc.,
742 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2014).
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
111
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discovered that, during the lead-up to bankruptcy, between October 15,
2007 and December 3, 2008, EAR made nine transfers to the IRS
totaling $4,737,261.36.117 EAR had apparently made these payments
on behalf of its shareholders in order to cover the shareholders’
income tax liability, which they incurred as a result of their receipt of
corporate profits.118
Now in bankruptcy, EAR, acting as debtor in possession, sought
to avoid the payments as constructively fraudulent transfers and
recover the funds.119 On January 20, 2010, EAR initiated an adversary
proceeding with the filing of a complaint against the United States.120
EAR subsequently amended its complaint to also include the
shareholders as defendants.121 Of the nine tax payments, eight
occurred within a two-year period prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.122 EAR sought to avoid these pursuant to the bankruptcy
avoidance powers in Section 548.123 As to these payments, EAR and
the IRS eventually reached a settlement, under which the IRS agreed
to disgorge the payments.124 The ninth payment, however, was the real
117

Id.
When companies offer to pay their principals’ income taxes as an additional
form of compensation,
118

“the IRS finds itself in the position of defendant in a fraudulent transfer action.
If an S corporation, which ordinarily owes no income taxes, pays the income
taxes for its shareholders, the S corporation arguably receives no value for this
payment. If at the time of such payments, the S corporation was insolvent,
undercapitalized, or knew it will incur debts beyond its ability to pay when
such debts come due, and the S corporation ends up in bankruptcy, the
payments may be challenged as constructive fraudulent transfers, both under
the Bankruptcy Code and under state law . . . .”
Alec P. Ostrow, Taxes and Transfers and Trusts, 2014 NORTON ANN. SURV.
BANKR. L. 2 (2014).
119
Equip. Acquisition Res., 451 B.R. at 457.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 458.
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source of contention between the parties. This payment had occurred
more than two years prior to bankruptcy. So, EAR could only avoid
the transfer through Section 544(b), which gave EAR access to state
fraudulent transfer law, here the Illinois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act,125 and that law’s longer reach-back period.126
The IRS filed its answer on January 13, 2011 and raised ten
defenses.127 In response to EAR’s Section 544(b) claim, the IRS raised
the defense of sovereign immunity, taking the familiar position that an
actual creditor bringing a claim outside of bankruptcy would not be
able to avoid a transfer to the IRS using the Illinois Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, and therefore neither could EAR.128
B. Disposition in the Lower Courts
The bankruptcy court described the issue as hinging on the
interplay between Sections 544 and 106, and undertook a thorough
statutory interpretation inquiry, examining the language of Section
106.129 In construing the statute, the court acknowledged that it was
not the first court to confront this issue.130 Indeed, the opinion quotes
heavily from the courts’ decisions in C.F. Foods and Custom
Contractors, and cites to their progeny, such as DBSI among others.131
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court found that “[t]he plain language of §
106(a)(1) is clear, precise, unambiguous, and straightforward,” and
that “when it abrogated sovereign immunity as to § 544 causes of
action, Congress intended to include those state law causes of action
available under § 544(b)(1).”132 Accordingly, the court denied the

125

744 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 160/5(a)(2) (West 2014).
Equip. Acquisition Res., 451 B.R. at 461.
127
Id. at 457.
128
Id. at 458.
129
Id. at 461-63.
130
Id. at 463.
131
Id. at 463-65.
132
Id. at 468.
126
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IRS’s motion to dismiss, and ordered the United States to pay back a
portion of the fraudulently transferred funds.133
The IRS appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, arguing that the bankruptcy court erred and that the
district court should vacate the order requiring the United States to
return the funds.134 The district court framed the issue as whether the
limits of Section 544(b) prevented avoidance notwithstanding the
abrogation of sovereign immunity in Section 106.135 In siding with
EAR and affirming the bankruptcy court’s holding, the district court
broadly held that “106(a)(1) simply eliminates the obstacle [of
sovereign immunity] wherever it appears ‘with respect to’ § 544.”136
Like prior courts, the Northern District court held that the IRS’s
sovereign immunity defense failed when put up against the “plain
language of §§ 106(a)(1) and 544(b)(1).”137
III. DISCUSSION OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN EQUIPMENT
ACQUISITION RESOURCES
Although Equipment Acquisition Resources was a case of first
impression for the Seventh Circuit, the court did not consider the case
on a blank slate. As shown in Part I, there was already a significant
body of case law when the case reached the Seventh Circuit.138 This
Part examines how the Seventh Circuit interpreted Sections 106 and
544 and decided Equipment Acquisition Resources in light of the
existing case law.

133

Id.
U.S. v. Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc. (In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc.),
485 B.R. 586, 591 (N.D. Ill. 2013), rev’d, In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742
F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2014).
135
Id. at 592.
136
Id. at 593.
137
Id.
138
See supra, Part I.B.
134
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A. Seventh Circuit’s Decision
Judge Flaum authored the Seventh Circuit’s opinion.139 The
opinion begins by examining the nature of Section 544 avoidance
actions, and focusing on the provision’s limits.140 The court
emphasized that the trustee’s strong-arm powers are circumscribed by
the confines of state law and the actual creditor requirement.141 First,
the court stated the legal standard for the “actual shoes” restriction,
reinforcing that the bankruptcy trustee’s strong-arm powers are
“derivative of state law,” and the trustee can only do in bankruptcy
“what a creditor would have been able to do outside of bankruptcy.”142
Second, the court called attention to the actual creditor requirement:
“If there are no creditors against whom the transfer is voidable under
the applicable law, the trustee is powerless to act under section
544(b)(1).”143 Since these two restrictions exist simultaneously, said
the court, “if the actual creditor could not succeed for any reason . . .
then the trustee is similarly barred and cannot avoid the transfer.”144
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion then proceeded to the substantive
merits of EAR’s claim, and it is here that the court parted ways with
the lower courts and prior case law. The court reasoned that EAR’s
claim failed due to the limits inherent in Section 544 itself, despite
106(a)’s explicit abrogation of sovereign immunity.145 More
specifically, the court held that EAR could not even satisfy the actual
creditor requirement of Section 544(b), which “by its very terms,
requires EAR to show that a creditor exists who could use a state’s
‘applicable law’ to recover the payment from the IRS.”146 The court
139

In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743, 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 746.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06[1] (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2014)).
144
Id.
145
Id. at 747.
146
Id.
140
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found that “there is no question that no [such] creditor exists in this
case . . . [A]n unsecured creditor would have been barred [by
sovereign immunity] from bringing an Illinois fraudulent-transfer
action against the IRS outside of bankruptcy.”147 An argument that
focuses on Section 106(a) instead of 544 “misses the point,” said the
court.148 Rather, “[n]othing in § 106(a)(1) gives the trustee greater
rights to avoid transfers than the unsecured creditor would have under
state law. By concluding that § 106(a)(1) did just that, the courts below
erred.”149 In short, the court rested its decision not on whether
Congress had successfully abrogated sovereign immunity in Section
106(a), but on the “unambiguous language” of § 544(b).150
The court further stated that EAR would fail to satisfy the actual
creditor requirement of Section 544(b) for other reasons, even if there
were no sovereign immunity questions.151 The court reasoned that
certain clauses of the U.S. Constitution pose other significant obstacles
to recovering money from the federal government.152 Specifically, the
Appropriations Clause in Article I Section 9 states that “No Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law . . . .”153 Courts have read this clause to
“mean[] simply that no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it
has been appropriated by an act of Congress.”154 Therefore, the court
stated, sovereign immunity issues notwithstanding, this clause would
prevent a creditor from using a state law to recover money from the
federal government; absent an act of Congress, the recovery payment
would violate the Appropriations Clause.155 Similarly, the court held
147

Id.
Id.
149
Id. at 748.
150
Id. at 749.
151
Id. at 747-48.
152
Id. at 748.
153
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
154
Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990).
155
Equip. Acquisition Res., 742 F.3d at 748 (“states cannot enforce their laws
so as to retrieve money from the federal coffers . . . .”).
148
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that the Supremacy Clause is yet another barrier.156 Under this clause,
the Constitution and federal law is “the supreme law of the land,” and
the states may not tax the federal government or empower their
citizens to recover federal taxes.157 For these reasons, said the Seventh
Circuit, it would be unconstitutional for a state law creditor to recover
tax payments from the federal government.158
The Seventh Circuit also justified its decision on policy
grounds.159 The court speculated that allowing recovery against the
IRS might make federal agencies more vulnerable to state-law-based
recovery actions.160 State legislatures could loosen the requirements
for avoidance under state law, which would allow recovery against the
IRS in various unforeseen situations.161 This result would be contrary
to the IRS’s interest in financial stability.162 Additionally, the court
observed that in cases where there is ambiguity as to whether
Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity, the ambiguity should

156

The Supremacy Clause of Article IV states:

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
157
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (“[S]tates have
no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner
control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into
execution the powers vested in the general government.”).
158
Equip. Acquisition Res., 742 F.3d at 748.
159
Id. at 750.
160
Id.
161
Id. (“state legislatures could relax the criteria for what constitutes a
fraudulent transfer, rendering federal tax revenue even more vulnerable to
unexpected recovery actions.”).
162
Id. (quoting United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 12
(2008)).
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be construed in favor of the sovereign.163 In other words, “when it
comes to sovereign immunity ties go to the government.”164
For these reasons, the Seventh Circuit found that EAR could not
satisfy the actual creditor requirement of Section 544(b).165 And as a
consequence of the court’s holding, there is no state law creditor that
can possibly satisfy the Section 544(b) actual creditor requirement in
cases where the federal government is the transferee. Simply put, there
are no shoes into which the trustee or debtor in possession can step.
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Response to C.F. Foods
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit also addressed C.F. Foods and
its progeny, acknowledging that its decision “diverge[d] from all of the
bankruptcy and district courts to consider the issue in the context of
the federal government.”166 The Seventh Circuit stated that those prior
cases erred by focusing too heavily on Section 106 and neglecting the
actual creditor requirement of 544(b).167
The court also responded to some of the individual points relied
on in prior opinions. For example, recall that C.F. Foods and other
courts reasoned that disallowing avoidance would render 106(a)
meaningless as to Section 544(b).168 The Seventh Circuit disagreed,
stating that Section 106(a) would still be applicable to 544(a), even if
inapplicable to 544(b).169 Unlike Section 544(b), 544(a) has no actual
creditor requirement; so a court considering a Section 544(a) claim
would not be concerned with whether an actual creditor could avoid a
transfer or would otherwise be barred by sovereign immunity.170 The
court’s position here draws some support from the fact that all the
163

Id.
Id.
165
Id. at 750-51.
166
Id. at 748.
167
Id. at 748-49.
168
See supra Part I.B.
169
Equip. Acquisition Res., 742 F.3d at 749.
170
Id.; compare 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(b) (West 2014) with § 544(a).
164
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sections named in 106(a) are referenced generally, according to their
section number, without any sign as to whether abrogation is limited to
particular lettered subsections.171 It would be strange, the court
reasoned, to expect Congress to specify that 106(a) applies only to
544(a) and not 544(b), when none of the other sections listed in 106(a)
are that specific.172 It is therefore at least possible that Congress
intended to abrogate sovereign immunity only as to Section 544(a) and
not all of Section 544.173
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit surmised that, after its holding,
there would still be situations where the abrogation in 106(a) would
apply to 544(b).174 Specifically, the waiver of sovereign immunity
might be meaningful in cases where the trustee seeks to recover a tax
payment from the debtor to a state or local governmental unit.175 In
that situation, if the state waived or abrogated its own sovereign
immunity to suits in state court, then 544(b) would allow the trustee to
bring an avoidance claim against the state in bankruptcy court as
well.176
The court rejected prior courts’ reliance on Congress’ intent and
the legislative history.177 History and intent cannot overcome the
“unambiguous language” of Section 544, said the Seventh Circuit.178
The Seventh Circuit also questioned the C.F. Foods court’s reading of
the legislative history. The House Report showed that Congress
171

Equip. Acquisition Res., 742 F.3d at 749 (“All of the fifty-nine provisions
listed in § 106(a)(1) cite to a Code provision generally, without listing particular
subsections. Yet, as the United States correctly points out, many of the listed
provisions have subsections that do not implicate sovereign immunity. We believe
the better conclusion is that Congress simply listed undivided Code sections if any
part of that section included something for which sovereign immunity should be
waived.”).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
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amended Section 106 to make it more clear and unambiguous.179 But,
according to the Seventh Circuit, assuring that the Bankruptcy Code
successfully abrogates sovereign immunity is a separate question,
unrelated to the issue of whether the trustee can satisfy the actual
creditor requirement in Section 544(b).180
IV. ARGUMENT
As compared to the outcome in Equipment Acquisition Resources,
the holdings in C.F. Foods and its progeny are better at reconciling the
Bankruptcy Code, promoting bankruptcy policy, and honoring
Congress’ intent underlying Section 106. Accordingly, I argue that
Equipment Acquisition Resources should be overruled and other courts
should not look to it for guidance.
The Seventh Circuit’s faith in the supposed plain and
unambiguous meaning of Section 544 is misplaced. Many of the other
courts that considered this same issue prior to Equipment Acquisition
Resources also purported to rely on the plain meaning of Sections 544
and 106.181 Therefore, it is possible, if not likely, for different courts to
reach opposite outcomes while professing to interpret a law’s plain
meaning and merely apply it to the facts.182 As one court remarked,
179

Id. at 750.
Id.
181
See supra Part I.B.
182
For other cases questioning the value of a plain meaning approach in
situations where there is disagreement over a statute’s interpretation, see, for
example, In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 422 B.R. 553, 565 (Bankr. E.D.
Penn. 2010) (observing that “five bankruptcy courts have now addressed th[is] issue
and they are sharply divided. In four decisions courts have expressly based their
ruling on the ‘plain meaning’ of the text of [this Rule] but have evenly split on that
‘plain meaning.’”); In re Turner, 384 B.R. 537, 540 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2008), rev’d,
574 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Bankruptcy courts have reached conflicting
conclusions as to the ‘plain meaning’ of § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).”); In re Curry, 362 B.R.
394, 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (“[I]t is difficult to see how recognition that [the
statute] ‘is susceptible to conflicting interpretations,’ can nonetheless lead to a
conclusion that any ultimate interpretation is ‘supported by the plain meaning . . . .’”
(internal citations omitted)).
180
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“like beauty, clarity is often in the eye of the beholder.”183 The
problem here is in the Seventh’s Circuit’s heavy reliance on the plain
meaning approach at the expense of other sources of meaning. If a
statute’s meaning is actually patent, then a single outcome would be
inevitable. Instead, where judges reach different and conflicting
interpretations, the only conclusion is that the meaning is not actually
plain.
In Equipment Acquisition Resources, the interaction between
Sections 544 and 106 is not plain. The Seventh Circuit focused on the
actual creditor requirement of Section 544(b), and found that a creditor
would be barred by sovereign immunity from avoiding a transfer to
the government notwithstanding Section 106.184 Conversely, C.F.
Foods and others reasoned that even if a creditor acting under state
law would be barred by sovereign immunity, that bar disappears in the
world of bankruptcy.185 The answer to this issue is not simple, and
courts may need to look beyond the statute’s language to other sources
of meaning, such as the statute’s purpose and Congress’ intent. It is too
facile for a court to imply that a solution is clear or obvious when
qualified judges acting in good faith come to different conclusions.
Heavy reliance on a statute’s language may also cause judges to
give short shrift to Congress’ intent and a statute’s purpose. As to
Section 106, the legislative history and House Reports show that
Congress specifically amended the statute to more explicitly and
unambiguously abrogate sovereign immunity after two Supreme Court
cases held that Section 106’s predecessor did not successfully abrogate
sovereign immunity.186 The legislative history thus shows that
Congress was careful to ensure that Section 106 successfully
abrogated sovereign immunity as to the enumerated sections. Further,
as the C.F. Foods court observed, the fact that Congress decided to
183

Price v. Delaware State Police Federal Credit Union U.S. Trustee (In re
Price), 370 F.3d 362, 368 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing that “notwithstanding their
perception of a plain meaning, [] courts have arrived at polar opposite results”).
184
See supra notes 139, 145-150 and accompanying text.
185
See supra notes 55, 70-75 and accompanying text.
186
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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include Section 544 in subsection 106(a)(1) strongly suggests that
Congress knew that it was including the strong-arm powers in the
scope of the waiver. But because the Seventh Circuit focused more on
the actual creditor requirement of Section 544, its holding ignores the
significance of this legislative history.
The Seventh Circuit’s approach also has the undesirable effect of
creating disharmony in the Bankruptcy Code. The court’s holding
renders Section 106(a) practically superfluous and inapplicable as to
Section 544(b)—a critical source of the trustee’s power to avoid
fraudulent transfers. Courts should avoid interpretations of statutes
that create “surplusage.”187 As to this argument, the Seventh Circuit
countered that 544(b) still has some application in cases involving
transfers to state governments that have waived their own sovereign
immunity.188 This point of view is plausible because 106(a) applies to
any “governmental unit,” including state and local governments.189
However, this interpretation creates an absurd result when the
transferee is the federal government. As the court in DBSI pointed out,
only Congress can waive the federal government’s sovereign
immunity; thus the Seventh Circuit’s holding will require Congress to
take the additional step of waiving sovereign immunity as to actions
brought under each individual state’s fraudulent transfer act.190
Equipment Acquisition Resources should be overruled for policy
reasons as well. The Seventh Circuit noted that its holding furthered
the policy of ensuring the IRS’s financial stability, because states
might amend their fraudulent transfer statutes to make it too easy to
187

See, e.g., U.S. v. Hernandez, 79 F.3d 584, 596 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e
recognize the time-honored rule that we are to avoid, if possible, a construction of a
statute that renders any term surplusage.”); Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101
U.S. 112, 115-16 (1879) (“It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that
significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every word. . . . ‘a statute
ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause,
sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ This rule has been
repeated innumerable times.”).
188
See supra notes 171, 174-176 and accompanying text.
189
11 U.S.C.A. § 106(a)(1) (West 2014).
190
See supra notes 85, 92-95 and accompanying text.
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avoid transfers to the IRS.191 However, at present this justification is
entirely based on speculation. There is no indication that this is likely
to happen, especially since most states have adopted the UFTA at the
recommendation of the model act’s drafters.192
Further, there is a strong bankruptcy policy in favor of promoting
what is best for the debtor’s creditors as a whole, and ensuring that
there is equity among them.193 Yet the Seventh Circuit’s holding favors
one of a debtor’s creditors—the IRS—over all others. The cases in this
article demonstrate that business-owners’ personal tax liability can be
substantial when profits are large. However, the Seventh Circuit’s
holding removes those assets from the bankruptcy estate and thus from
the pot of money which is eventually distributed to the debtor’s
creditors. Therefore, this holding is contrary to the two bankruptcy
policies of maximizing the debtor’s estate and ensuring equity among
creditors. For these reasons, courts should not follow Equipment
Acquisition Resources and should instead adopt the reasoning of C.F.
Foods and its progeny.
CONCLUSION
When the federal government becomes a target for avoidance, a
conflict arises between Sections 106(a) and 544(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code. Various courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have attempted to
resolve this tension by relying on the Code provisions’ plain meaning.
However, the differing court decisions on this issue demonstrate that
the meaning of these statutes is not plain, and a resolution is not
obvious. As such, this article asserts that courts should be willing to
look to other sources of meaning, such as Congress’s intent and
191

See supra notes 158, 160-162.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
193
See, e.g., Graham v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Medcorp, Inc.), 472 B.R.
444, 450 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2012) (“The policy rationale of [avoidance] is to
maximize the estate assets available to a debtor's general body of unsecured creditors
. . . .”); First Union Nat’l Bank v. Gibbons (In re Matter of Princeton-N.Y. Investors,
Inc.), 219 B.R. 55, 65-66 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998) (discussing the bankruptcy goal for
“the Trustee to maximize the bankruptcy estate for creditors' benefit . . . .”).
192
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traditional bankruptcy policy. Following this approach, courts should
hold that sovereign immunity is abrogated as to state law causes of
action brought by the trustee under Section 544(b). This outcome
better harmonizes the Bankruptcy Code, promotes bankruptcy policy,
and honors Congress’s intent while staying within the boundaries of
the statutes’ language.
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